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Geography: de facto or de jure
F. LUKERMANN1
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis
ABSTRACT-The acceptance of the Kantian classification of geography among the sciences as the
science of space carries with it certain methodological obligations. Geographers who advocate a
macroscopic approach to research are especially bound by Kantian strictures to employ mechanistic models of gravity, equilibrium and potential force fields in their studies. The limitations of such
functional models in formulating hypotheses and the underlying assumptions these models make
in causal explanations are examined in detail. Reference is made to a number of studies in the
post-war period, culminating in the programmatic statement for the macroscopic method in geography published by the Geographical Review in April, 1958.

Within the past decade various articles have been published in the professional geography journals advocating
a new approach to the study of geography - the macroscopic.1n
The word may be new but the problem is old. Whatever the titular rubric may be, methodology of description is the moot point of .all geographic research. Thus,
the research published by the Geographical Review, although filled with exemplary suggestions of what could
and should be done "to permit the discipline to assume
a status at least equal to that of the other social sciences,"
basically asks a simple question: how to observe, what
to observe, and how to generalize what has been observed?
The article cited above from Economic Geography,'
while concerned primarily with the general interdisciplinary relations of economics and economic geography,
raises a similar question, that is, how and what kind of
data from discrete observations can be extrapolated into
aggregate theory?
The more specific discussions in The Professional Geographer are examples of the difficulties that are encountered when one tries to answer this basic question
in order to explain events studied by geographers. The
discussions arose from a specific problem of location and
the solution proposed by a mechanical model that was
originally constructed according to what was called the
generalizing or macroscopic approach. The balance of
this paper is the extension of those discussions to the
much broader contention, implicit and explicit in the
literature cited above, that the study of geography, in
general, is best carried out by a macroscopic approach
instead of the microscopic approach that prevails in geographic research.
Macroscopic/Nomothetic - Microscopic/ldiographic
The macroscopic versus microscopic argument, as we
have noted, is not entirely new. Basically, the present
1
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fencing between disputants is but a continuation of the
nomothetic/ideographic duels that were carried on in all
the sciences in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Geography was deeply involved in that controversy as can be readily seen in the English, German,
and French geographic literature of the time, and for
proof that the argument is still normal in the cultural
sciences one need but scan the professional journals,
yearbooks and Festschriften of today.
With this general background in mind we may turn to
the current discussion in geography with but one digression, to note that the late nineteenth-century arguments
structured the · nomothetic/idiographic dualism as, essentially, a distinction in the study of the general as opposed to the unique. Currently, the same basic dualism
is emphasized but the phrasing is different. The present
methodological distinction between macroscopic/microscopic can be summarized as a difference in the level of
abstraction, or, more precisely, in the size of the descriptive unit. In geography, macroscopic refers to group
or aggregate descriptive relations, i.e., to the description
of wholes rather than fragmented phenomena.
A further note concerning the earlier viewpoint is important, in passing, although the present macroscopic
"school" does not entirely agree on it. Scientific dualism,
as it emerged, was essentially Kantian in origin; the interest of geographers largely centered on Kant's classification of the field of knowledge, as experienced, among
"science," history and geography. 2 Most modern macroscopic geographers make some reference to this particular segregation of the field of knowledge but their own
classifications in part diverge from it. Two variant views
may be cited.
(a) One view is concerned primarily with the implied
dichotomy between "science" and history /geography,
i.e., general versus unique. Yet, the further division between history and geography ( time and space) is recognized. Geographers, admitting no other kind of geography than the generic, would deny, insofar as the "lawgiving" denotation of "nomothetic" is concerned, the
study of process and process laws. They concede that
the generic approach necessarily involves a concomitant
search for "process laws" - but not by geographers. This
methodological position poses problems for the macroscopic geographer who is attempting to state regularities
or laws about group variables, such as regions, struc189

tural wholes, and functional statistical aggregates. He is
asked to construct generic concepts and variables in areal
wholes, to define their lawful composition in temporal
cross section, but without direct reference to the process
of their integration. The question arises, therefore, of
how it is possible to generalize about group oi- functional
relations among areally distributed. phenomena and yet
ignore the sequential character of :their occurrence? 3
(b) The other view apparently chooses to ignore the
traditional emphasis · given to the Kantian classification.
In quoting Kant, "Geography and history fill the entire
span of our knowledge: geography that of space, history
that of time," the major concern of this group seems to
be solely in the establishment of the spatial nature of
geography and not in the separation of geography and
history from "science." Further, this view would avoid
Kant's explicit separation of time and space - for good
reasons, as we will see later, but not, necessarily, logically consistent ones. 4
Common ground for the two views is found only in
the Kantian expression of the spatial nature of geography. The corollary, that geography is a generic study
without basic reference to time, is apparently not an absolutely necessary macroscopic tenet; nevertheless, it
will reappear as an important element in our later argument. Initially, our concern is with the more general spatial definition of the field. It is based on the assumption
that in one way or another geographers are concerned
with the study of phenomena in space. With but few exceptions, modern geography, both descriptive and scientific, agrees with this assumption. However, since it is
chiefly the macroscopic geographers who contend that
scientific (model-level) laws explain or can be vividly
used in explanations of empirical events, the discussion
here is limited to their work.
The Mechanistic Macroscopic Meaning of "Space"

If one takes the writings of F. Schaefer, W. Warntz,
J. Q. Stewart, and W. Isard as undoubted instances of
the macroscopic approach, one is struck immediately by
their common terminology and phraseology. But more
importantly, their basic approach to the study of geography, is, however explicated, grounded on a singular concept of space: Space is independent of the phenomena it
contains. Seemingly the concept has been fundamental
to science since Newton, to philosophy since Kant and,
therefore, is predicate to a modern scientific geography.
It is in the validity and applicability of this concept of
space that the answer lies as to whether geography is a
science in the macroscopic sense. The logical proof of
causality and explanation is inextricably entwined with
the concept of space for all classical mechanics and, consequently, as we will show, for most of the geographic
applications of equilibrium and structural-functional theory.
Without specifying at length all the instances of this
concept of space in the work of the above mentioned
writers, and with the understanding that the concept is
not limited to their geographical writings, we may cite
some provocative examples.
190

( 1) . . . geography had to be conceived as the science
, concerned with the formulation of the laws governing the spatial distribution of certain features on the
surface of the earth. The latter limitation is essential. For with the successful rise of geophysics, astronomy, and geology, geography can no longer deal
with the whole earth, but only the earth's surface
and "with the earthly things that fill its spaces."
(quotation from Ritter: " . . . der irdisch erfullten
Riiume der Erdoberffache.")
Humboldt and Ritter thus recognized as the major
concern of geography the manner in which the natural phenomena, including man, were distributed in
space. This implies that geographers must describe
and explain the manner in which things combine "to
fill an area." 5
(2) The mere assembling of more and more areas,
even with an increase in detail, does not- mean a
shift in point of view from microscopic to macroscopic. A heightening of the level of abstraction is
the significant thing, an insistence on the functional
consistency and organic unity of the whole, a recogition that no part of a true system can be thoroughly
understood without reference to the whole.
A sufficiently abstract and subtle measure of position has for the most part eluded geographers, and
this fact has precluded the development of a macrogeography capable of producing generalizations
about space-occupying systems. 6
The income-potential concept treats the units of
income as parts of an economic system in a spatial
continuum in which all the units are inter-related.
From the microgeography of income is created a
spatially continuous macroscopic variable. . . . if
the phenomenon of price is to be regarded as occurring in a space continuum, then demand must be
quantified as a spatially continuous "field quantity."
Potential, in general, is just such a field quantity. 7
( 3) . . . we must recognize the obvious fact that economic activity takes place in a time-space continuum. In general, to minimize effort or factor services in producing a given social output or to maximize social output with a given amount of effort
and factor services, is not to choose a path of action
with respect to the time axis alone, or to the space
axis alone, but rather with respect to both axes. 8
Some comment on the reason for the selection and the
general context of the above quotations is necessary to
rationalize the order of argument that follows.
The excerpt from Schaefer was chosen primarily because of his emphasis on the nomothetic approach to explanation in geographic studies. Within this same article
he makes a special point of emphasizing the morphological character of geographic research which, within modern methodology, is equivalent to the insistence that geographic study be generic and structural-functional in nature rather than genetic and concerned with process.
The Minnesota Academy-of Science

Schaefer thus represents one perspective of. the macroscopic position, albeit not necessarily a mechanistic one.
The selection from Stewart and Warntz is from a late
publication in which their previous work is summarized
to a large extent. Their perspective is mechanistic and
organismic; and, strange as that combination may seem
at first glance, it is quite logical within the operational
context of their terminology - e.g. "functional consistency," "organic unity," "space continuum," "field quantity." The particular point to be examined is the logical
relation between "generalizations about space-occupying
systems" and the "spatially continuous field quantity."
Immediately, the analogue of the gravitational field in
classical mechanics is brought to mind, and from that
position it is but a short step to a field theory and the
organic whole's determining its parts through functional
consistency. What we have, in short, is a full range of
borrowings from the physical and biological sciences to
handle conceptually the "generic" content of geography:
(a) the concept of a field; (b) the concept of a structure (morphology); and (c) the concept of function.
The quotation from Isard is a selection based, not on
the fact that he is a geographer, but, rather, on the fact
that he represents a macroscopic approach to the problem of space in economics. As one of the major investigators in the field of "location theory," he must necessarily deal with what he calls the space "factor" or "variable" which, operationally, means the introduction of
a "distance variable" ( of greater than zero dimension)
into equilibrium formulae. Our specific interest, however, is not with that problem but with the relation, if
any, of the concepts "time-space continuum" and "time
axis . . . space axis" within the concept of space held
by geographers who use a macroscopic approach. Clearly
we have no real quarrel with Isard in that: (a) he states
categorically the unreality of his constructs; (b) he
makes no attempt to "explain" events; (c) space is
simply the measured distance between economic variables; and, consequently, (d) "location" as it is implemented in his theory has no relation with geographic
"place." 9 Only on points ( c) and ( d) is there a possible
geographic issue and then only insofar as we suspect that
the mechanistic geographers are not capable of dealing
with geographic location either - and for the same reasons.
Five questions for discussion have been formulated
from the preceding material. They are:
( 1) Is the concept of space held by geographers that,
(a) space exists prior to and independent of the
phenomena that it contains - and is, therefore, a
priori; or is it "that, (b) space is nothing more than
the order and relation of phenomena - and is, therefore, a posteriori?
In geography, as practiced, this may be stated
more clearly as, a given point in the first concept
of space has only position, i.e. is fixed by, or is
relative to a given grid of coordinates of the whole.
A given point in the second concept of space has
location, i.e., is fixed by, or is relative to vicinal
Journal of, Volume Thirty-two, No. 3, 1965

phenomena. In this context, the above question
about space may be restated as a question of place:
Is place in a meaningful geographical sense referent to position, to location, or to both?
(2) Is the concept of causality and scientific explanation
derivative from a particular concept of space (and
time)?
( 3) How is the whole specified so that it encompasses
its functional parts alone - and makes analysis ( explanation) of its parts possible?
( 4) How do these concepts operationally affect the use
of: (a) field theory: (b) structural (morphological)
correlation, and ( c) functional analysis in geography?
( 5) What do we mean by explanation in geographical
studies?
The remainder of this article examines briefly these
issues in their geographical context.
(1) The Space of Newton and Kant

The two concepts of space cited are, of course, conterminous with literate man. We may legitimately label
them Newtonian/Kantian and Leibnizian only insofar as
our modem understanding of the terms were definitively
formulated by them. Thus, Newton, in his attempt to explain the distribution of planetary masses, specified an
"absolute space" in order to determine analytically the
position of the planetary masses. His mechanical model,
postulated on Euclidian geometry and the hypothesis of
a force field pervasive in empty space, accounted for the
planetary mass positions-without significant error. However, because space independent of phenomena could not
be observed, Newton conceived of his absolute space as
an a priori perception of the mind.
Kant, following Hume and Newton and still bound
by Euclidian constructions, considered space ( and time)
as forms of our intuition, Le., space and time could be
"visualized" but not directly observed. It follows, in his
famous characterization of history and geography, that
"empirical knowledge" is ordered by time and space, but
it is clear that time and space are not empirical perceptions and must, therefore, be a priori. 10 It was Kant's
further contention that his concept of space, although
being a priori, was nevertheless synthetic. This contention supposedly followed from the fact that geometric
theorems were "built up" from a few self-evident axioms.
With the formulation of nonEuclidian geometries, however, it has been established that geometric theorems
are, in fact, analytically derived from a conceived structure of space. The space of mathematics is purely relational and deductive and not a matter of physical measurement and synthesis. 11
The importance of these developments for geography
are two fold. (A) The Kantian view of geography is
framed in concepts which are admittedly non-empirical,
but, nevertheless, are considered to be nature's direct
language. The mechanical model of the universe is con191

sidered to be isomorphic with reality. Number and figure
are, therefore, not only logical but intuitively self-evident.
The mechanical model directly explains reality if it accounts for empirical observations. (B) Accepting the
Kantian definition of space and time as a framework for
geography and history, without qualification, ignores
practically all the developments of nineteenth- and
twentieth-century physics and mathematics. In that century and a half it was shown that Kantian/Newtonian
space was in fact neither synthetic, intuitive, nor selfevident, but, rather, logical and abstract. In essence,
modern science had conceptually shifted from the intuitive three-dimensional space of Kant, directly apprehending reality, to logical n-dimensional manifolds of mathematical space - models without direct reference to reality.
This shift from intuitive space to logical space cannot
be over emphasized as it changes the basis of scientific
explanation from supposed direct reference to observed
reality to a constructed model independent of observed
reality. This new orientation is evidenced in the method
of relating a model to empirical data. A model has value
only to the degree that the consequences of its hypotheses
account for observed phenomenal occurrence. Correspondence of either the model or the assumptions underlying the hypotheses of the theory with observed reality
are important only in that they control the character of
the predictions. The sole test of a scientific model as to
the relevance of its explanatory power rests on its predictability.
In short, the Newtonian theory of gravitation has heuristic value not because it explains the planetary system
but merely because it accounts for our present empirical
knowledge of that system. When our empirical observation falsifies the predictions of Newtonian theory we
change or discard the model and our explanation - we
do not weight the observed facts to correspond to the
predictions of the model.
Geographers are involved, then, in two kinds of space:
(a) mathematical space which is logical and abstract the parametric system of their models; and (b) descriptive and statistical space which is physical and directly
observed. We need not concern ourselves immediately
with this second kind of space, but need, rather, concentrate on the first kind of space which is the explanatory
space of mechanistic macroscopic geography, as currently
practiced. It is the space of the space-time continuum, of
the time axis and the space axes, of the potential, of the
field quantity, of the spatial factor; in short, the true
system of an organic unity of the whole - the realm of
the spatially continuous macroscopic variable.
Mechanistic geographers, dealing in aggregates equivalent to masses, find that the presumed "forces" and "resistances" of these aggregates must be situated in a continuum in order to be effective. The problem so stated
is directly analogous to the problem that faced Newton.
A force of resistance field is hypothesized in order to
explain action at a distance. This involves a necessary
assumption of a continuum. Too often we phrase the
problem as merely that the force field is an effect of the
192

masses. Insofar as the explanation of the field is to be
found in the distribution of the masses in a continuum
we must assert the primacy of the conceptual space. The
position of the masses is determined by the nature of the
space manifold. Thus, for any gravity model the position
of the parts is analytically determined from the whole
( the continuum with its masses) .12
(2) What is Causality?

At this stage of the discussion we may go on to a consideration of the second question: the problem of causality and scientific explanation. Accepting the position of
Hume that cause and effect are neither empirically perceived nor inductively testable, it is evident that causality,
as far as science is concerned, is "proved" only within
a logical analytic framework. Modern science, in thus
insisting on a deductive explanation of the causal process,
has made the logico-mathematical model its operational
instrument. The use of the model in establishing causality
and giving explanation to empirical events in this scientific sense, has been elaborated in the article on a specific problem of location, previously cited. 13 The conclusion there, as in this discussion on space, is that causality
and explanation in science have reference only to its
models.
We have shown up to this point that the model of the
mechanistic macroscopic geographers is mathematical,
that the predictions of the model are analytically determined and that the explanation, or cause, of the resultant pattern is deductively derived. Therefore, in so
far as the geographer's space context is mathematical, the
meaning of causality and explanation for him, as other
scientists, follows from the tautological nature of that
model.
(3) What is a Whole?

The third issue, the specification of the whole, emerges
out of the preceding discussion as the crucial problem
for the macroscopic geographer. Thus far, we have specified two wholes, of which neither is of much use to the
working geographer. The whole of a priori space hardly
seems applicable given the subject matter of traditional
geography; the whole of a posteriori space (all phenomena) seems even more meaningless from an operational
viewpoint. Nevertheless, the methods used in formulating
both these conceptual wholes are instructive. The a
posteriori concept of space is obviously an empirical,
synthetic formulation, but the a priori concept appears
to be the result of an antithetical procedure. Reflection
on Newton's problem and solution, however, reveals the
procedures to be intially identical: one of microscopic
(idiographic) research, inductive and synthetic up to the
point of hypothesizing for the model. At that point, th~
break with empirical reality is made. From the inductive
generalizations a particular case is hypothesized, a mathematical space postulated, and the model formulated. The
return to reality is, thereafter, a matter of deduction and
the continued verification of the predictions.
This is the answer to question three. Admittedly, there
is only one way to prove that a whole contains its funcThe Minnesota Academy of Science

tional parts - by the logico-mathematical model. This is
also, tautologically, the only method of explaining the
parts of the whole. Thus, we are confronted with a lacuna between scientific truth and empirical reality. Only
through experience can we gain knowledge of the world;
yet only through logic will we accept the "truth" of that
experience. We specify the whole inductively from our
observation of presumed functionally related parts; we
prove or explain the whole and its parts by the construction of a deductive model. 14 What is the point of all this
unless we look upon the model solely as an aid to discourse on our empirically contingent world?
If we are constructing models for discourse, whether
they be mechanistic or probability models, it behooves
us to make sure that our inductive generalizations are
about a possible universe, or whole, of which the predictions of our model will be a part. This is the most serious problem of the macroscopic approach. The solution
is in the microscopic acquisition of data and the description of a possible universe. As we have seen, that is a
synthetic procedure, which always involves data of "duration" as well as of "extension." The predictions of the
model are for some whole, and it would help if we had
an inkling of what that whole was before we constructed
the model. There is one way - empirical and synoptic.1 5
(4) Structural-Functional Analysis
(a) It is now clear that the whole-part problem is
basically an empirical one and sums up under one heading the questions of, how do we operationally use mathematical space, and how do we scientifically explain? The
problem is most apparent in those fields of geography
concerned with statistical data and their manipulation.
In structural-functional analysis, for example, the problem has become so critical that we have reached a methodological impasse as to the meaningfulness of our procedure.
The other social sciences have long been uneasy over
many aspects of structural-functional analysis, particularly in the interpretation of results. The dangers of teleological bias, adaptation-adjustment "determinism," etc. in
the explanatory use of the method are only too well
known. But since these are not necessarily innate characteristics of the procedure, they can be avoided by careful research technique. 16 Our concern is with the intrinsic problem - the specification of the whole that sets the
relative value of the parts. Here it is not a matter of being careful, it is a matter of knowing the universe or
throwing out the method.
An example of the problem from so-called macroscopic field theory may serve as an introduction to the
more common structural-functional problem. Stewart
and Warntz, over the years, have discussed at length the
predictive value of the population potential model in accounting for geographical distributions of "national" college and prep-school students in the United States. A
typical case study concerns Phillips Exeter Academy .17
The authors felt that the model predicted the distribution
in the Northeast and Midwest accurately, but for the

Journal of, Volume Thirty-two, No. 3, 1965

South and West there were significant discontinuities.
Their solution to such variations was to adjust the "molecular weight" of people by 0.8 in the South ( 1.0 for
whites, 0.333 for colored), and by 2.0 in the West. Several implications followed from this procedure: (1) people are not a "population"; thus, (2) the summed "influence" or "accessibility" of people is either greater, the
same, or less than the "influence" or "accessibility" of
the population mass; consequently ( 3) the distribution
of "masses" in the universe "national" is not accounted
for by a single model; and, therefore, ( d) the "national
drawing power" force field is not a spatially continuous
macroscopic variable in a space continuum in which all
the units are functionally interrelated. Without comment
about the grossness of the calculations or the "mischief
of the isopleth," it seems fair to assume from this research that there are several spatial continua, that wholes
or universes overlap, and that possibly the United States
is not a consistent functional unit - as the model assumes. Given their own research, the failure of the macroscopic geographers to comprehend the problems of
"scale" in geographic generalizations, and the necessity
for limited areal generalizations, is difficult to understand.18
Field theory, more properly equilibrium theory as explicated above, is nothing more than structural-functional
analysis applied to an a priori continuous space. The intrinsic problem is the same: how does one specify the
continuum or whole? The only answer which as yet seems
to make sense is a microscopic synthesis.
(b-c) The use of structural correlation and functional analysis is so widespread in geography that the specific research techniques and conclusions drawn from such
studies need not be examined here. We shall, rather, discuss, very briefly, the general underlying assumptions of
the structural-functional whole.
First, let it be understood that by function we mean a
simple Pythagorean definition of the term: of quantities
varying proportionately without ceasing to be bound by
a fixed relationship. 19 The application of this principle in
geography is best exemplified in occupational analysis,
particularly in the urban-economic classification of cities.
In attempting to classify ( or explain?) cities by structural correlation, the structural-functional whole of the
"economic city" inevitably comes into discussion, which
in tum generally resolves into the question of which activities (parts) are basic or nonbasic. In that we are
defining a city in its whole/part occupational structure
analytically, however, the question should be what is the
whole, not what is the basic or nonbasic part? A functional model absolutely forbids any part from being considered as more "basic" than another. Possibly, this is
not what the terms basic, nonbasic refer to in the geographer's mind. If so, in order to use the functional concept,
he must switch his thinking from the "city" as an integrated whole to a search for the economic whole of
which elements in the city and outside the city are the
functional parts. In geography, the viewing of cities as an
organic unit, or as a kind of phenomena in which the
parts are so integrated that they are amenable to func193

tional analysis and, thereby, to structural correlation, has
led to almost total confusion.
As has often been pointed out, it is the size or order
of area unit that is critical. Functions (specifically, their
structural-correlation values) are determined by the specific space context of the study, by the scale of the investigation. 20 There are functions going on in the city,
without doubt, but the city has no functional consistency.
The city is not an organism; it is neither part of a homologous series nor is it in mechanical equilibrium. The city
in this case is people; and people are not a given statistical population to be manipulated by the law of numbers.
Populations or universes are selected. As in field theory, so in functional analysis the "space context" should
be arrived at through microscopic synthesis of described
relations, not by throwing an arbitrary a priori net. Geographical space is nothing more than the order and relation of the phenomena of the earth's surface. Thus,
geography is concerned with "local conditionality" - and
precisely that; but local conditionality always requires
definition. Geographic place is defined and given relation with reference to the abstract case as well as by
being described in its unique matrix. The argument has
never been that the abstract case, or more specifically,
the particular case which is the scientific "model," the
statistical "curve," the morphological "type," the "ideal,"
et al., is not important in geography. The contention is
that only in so far as we limit the criteria of our generalizations, or the hypotheses of our models, to particular
cases subordinate to our inductive generalizations, will
we be able to make classifications or predictions pertinent to reality. Only then will we have "explanations"
in our universe of discourse.
(5) How Do We Explain?

Thus, we see scientific explanation as far removed
from the context within which the macroscopic geographers would have us put it - the end product of geographic research. Science does not explain reality, it explains the consequences of its hypotheses. If we are willing to accept the particular case as representative of a
class of observed events, we have what may be called a
rnodel-level explanation of those events; but only as long
as the particular case remains representative, and is not
falsified by continued empirical investigation. It is doubtful whether many models will be forthcoming from the
contingent world of geography, but that is not to say
they should be either denied or shunned.
The descriptive world of traditional geography, be it
unique or general, cannot attest to any such explanatory
power. Nevertheless, it seems difficult to deny that most
of the world of our experience is "explained" descriptively to our evident satisfaction. The answer to the question "why /how" does not often involve a full model-level
explanation, and the contention that a model-level explanation is "understood" in such answers is more wishful thinking than fact. However, to avoid an argument
on "what is meant by satisfaction," etc., we would also
contend with the macroscopic geographers that mere ob194

ject-level description and classification is intellectually if
not academically enervating and cannot properly be
equated with what we mean by explaining an event or
occurrence.
There remains one last level of understanding, which
does bridge the gap between object and model, but it
presents difficulties of interpretation if we accept a "no
process" qualification in geography. Perhaps this is a
complete misinterpretation, but, if by process is meant
"a series of actions or events," it is very hard to see how
geography can avoid an interest in process. 21 Evidently
the denial stems from Kant insofar as process is taken to
involve passage in time, and only history is properly concerned with phenomena in time. It can be shown, however, that history is no more concerned with phenomena
as to a priori time than geography is with a priori space.
The question of the right of eminent domain for either,
in the ordering of phenomena in empirical space-time, is
patently illogical. 22
More specifically, how can generic categories be ascertained without recourse to the study of process? Existence is composed of, and composition involves, duration as well as extension. The serial nature of phenomena
and events is a fact that we must take into account. It
cannot be generalized out of our subject matter unless
we wish to deny the entire backlog of our discipline.
Geography has always studied the human situation.
From the Ionian logographers to Fleure and Sauer this
has been the most consistent road taken.
Only in accepting process as an integral part of empirical investigation in geography do we finally make possible the relation of the particular to the general. It is
in carrying through this relation that we really attain
what may be properly called an explanation that directly
involves the factual content of the discipline. In combining the object-level description and model-level explanation in a speculative but probabilistic schema, geography
achieves what is best described as a discourse-level narrntive. 23 Unfortunately, being somewhat short on models
and rather long on descriptions, geography is more possibilistic than probabilistic at the moment. On the other
hand, there really seems to be a wider gap than most of
us are willing to admit between our "chancy" world and
that of Newton or Comte. To fill this gap of understanding we turn, and not reluctantly, to the explanatory narrative which alone integrates our categorized subject matter into the scope of human experience. It is in relating
the circumstances of the particular that we make use of
the generic content of science and create a geography.
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